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It may be a luminous interlude with a beloved, a moment of radiant silence, or ecstatic union with a phrase of music or the wide open world—something 
larger and more alive than anything imaginable. Time 
stops, grace descends as a lucent mist, and something 
within you feels the heart of the world. These moments, 
however fleeting, sustain the soul; they inspire and help 
to make life worth living. Yet what do they mean? Perhaps 
these are merely the side effect of some happenstance 
chemical event in the brain (cf. Persinger, 2001), and 
maybe cultural stories of mystical experiences and 
exceptional capacities are just tales made up to explain 
suggestion and neural noise. 
While it oversimplifies, this dismissiveness is 
close to much conventional academic stance toward 
such reports, whether in religious studies or psychology. 
This attitude is understandable given the difficulty of 
obtaining empirical evidence for the cognitive value of 
such experiences. Counter to this position are claims 
that these experiences open the door to a hidden inner 
dimension that science and psychology must either 
dismiss or accept on faith, which takes the topic out of 
the sphere of scientific inquiry altogether (Friedman, 
2002). Yet there may be a way to consider these ephemeral 
moments with an evidence-based science that neither 
accepts nor rejects uncritically. To fashion this is a task 
that a transpersonal approach to psychology may be able 
to take up (cf. Hartelius, 2014a)—and it is to this end 
that a careful focus on philosophy is necessary.  
 Imagine you are standing across from a painting 
at a museum. You might describe it in ways that someone 
standing next to you could affirm as accurate, or perhaps 
supplement with slightly different words: “That is a 
Rembrandt, a painting showing the bust of a young 
woman against a dark background, with shadow on part 
of her face. It looks like she is wearing a pearl necklace.” 
A hundred people might look at the same painting and 
be able to agree, more or less, with this description. 
This is what generally counts as objective 
knowledge—descriptions of things that pretty much 
anyone could agree on. This assumes that the world is 
made of objects, of things that can appear roughly the 
same to many observers. Yet diaphanous glimpses that 
seem to lift out of ordinary experience are not concrete 
things, so they are quietly demoted to the status of 
subjective daydreams and imagination. Given their 
power within human experience, however, it seems 
negligent to dismiss their legitimacy so simply.  
 Standing in the museum there is a sense in which 
you are here, as observer, and the painting is there, on the 
wall, as an object. In objective knowledge, your personal 
hereness and your relationship with the painting is more 
or less taken for granted, based on the assumptions that 
standing in front of a painting is the right way to relate 
to it and that anyone who was here would see much the 
same thing. If you were a postmodernist, you might 
challenge these assumptions by thinking of all the other 
ways you could be in relationship with the painting: 
you might invert it or view it through a kaleidoscope, 
you might take a photo of it, turn the colors wild and 
alive, cut the image into slices and rearrange them in 
a way that evokes a throbbing animate force. Or, you 
might consider that a person not oriented to fine arts 
might think a “Rembrandt” was a new kind of digital 
printer, or that a newborn might see only vague patterns 
of dark and light. All of this play can lead to fresh and 
creative approaches to the world, and can also be used 
to deconstruct or reconstruct any piece of information, 
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leaving no effective consensus and no reliable knowledge 
(e.g., Rorty, 1979). While postmodern approaches can 
thus challenge existing orthodoxies and resulting false 
paradoxes, they are less helpful in developing productive 
ways of understanding experiences that are already 
marginalized and poorly understood.
 It is for this conundrum that participatory 
thought within transpersonal psychology (Ferrer, 2002), 
drawing deeply on feminist thought, seems to offer a way 
forward. From this standpoint, reality is not objective in 
the conventional sense that it is separate from me or that 
I can stand back from it and take it in like a painting on 
the wall, and yet it is not merely subjective in the sense 
that it is just something made up in the mind. Reality 
is actual, real, but you and I are part of it, immersed 
in it, not observers who can stand back from it and 
give an objective account; the public space is woven of 
relationships rather than constructed of separate objects 
(cf. Thayer-Bacon, 2003, 2010). Reality is being on the 
canvas and in the painting, and my relational perspective 
is necessarily colored by my location (cf. Harding, 1991, 
2004). 
 To apply this to the metaphor of a Rembrandt 
painting, even if I am able to see the whole painting, it 
is from the standpoint of a particular location within 
the painting. If I am situated in what an art historian 
might describe as the dark background color typical 
of Rembrandt’s work, then the area around me may 
seem dark, with lighter areas visible elsewhere; if I am 
located in one of the painted pearls, I might describe the 
foreground as bright and lustrous, surrounded by dark 
areas farther out. My situatedness on the painting means 
I cannot escape the fact that my experience is limited by 
location, nor the fact that universal knowledge—which 
implies knowledge either from no specific location 
(Nagel, 1989) or from a detached location deemed 
authoritative—is impossible for anyone to attain; 
however, I can expand my understanding through 
dialogue and relationship. In fact, the same locatedness 
that makes universal knowledge unreachable makes 
relationship both necessary and possible. For this reason 
a participatory approach foregrounds the values that 
inform relationship, and holds interest in speculations 
about universals or ultimates primarily as these represent 
co-created distillations of their respective value system.  
 In this sense, participatory thought invites 
transpersonal psychology to a radical shift of focus 
away from concern with objective universal truth about 
transcendent reality, and toward a consideration of how a 
particular culturally situated vision fosters transformative 
development of individuals and communities, and 
cultivates compassion, respect, and symmetrical 
relationship. It invites an approach to knowledge that 
holds inclusiveness and diversity not only as preferable 
and socially moral, but as imperative and indispensable 
for effective knowledge creation (Hartelius, 2014b). 
Efforts to reframe participatory thought as yet another 
iteration of a perennial philosophy, which asserts 
privileged knowledge about the objective nature of 
ultimate reality (e.g., Abramson, 2015), fail to grasp the 
nature of a participatory stance toward the ontological 
status of any and all visions of ultimacy. 
 The early field of transpersonal psychology sought 
to add to humanistic psychology by considering not only 
the primacy of human experience and relationship, but 
also the “farther reaches of human nature” (Maslow, 
1969, p. 1), including peak experience, transcendent 
experience, ultimate verities, and transcendent values. 
Shortly after the inception of the field, Ken Wilber 
(1975) proposed that all of these aspirations might point 
toward a transcendent nondual ultimate dimension 
beyond the dualities of human sense experience—an 
ultimate that was the ontological source and goal of all 
human spirituality. 
This perennialist philosophy gained wide 
acceptance within the transpersonal community and 
remained as a dominant viewpoint (Rothberg, 1986) 
until challenges by Ferrer (1998, 2002, 2009, 2011a) 
and others (Hartelius, 2015a; Hartelius & Ferrer, 
2013; Rothberg & Kelly, 1998; Schneider, 1987, 
1989), and the development of participatory thought 
as an alternate (Ferrer, 2002; Ferrer & Sherman, 2008), 
gained considerable influence (Ferrer, 2011b). Critiques 
of Wilber’s (e.g., 2000, 2006) integral theory include 
concerns that it is metaphysical in the sense that no 
independent evidence can be mustered to support the 
primacy of the structure of reality that Wilber asserts, 
and hierarchical in the sense that ultimate truth claims 
for one version of reality reduces the status of all other 
versions; furthermore, it fails to resolve the Cartesian 
tension that, in a modernist context, devalues mystical, 
spiritual, and other exceptional experiences as merely 
subjective constructions. 
In response to these and other critiques 
Wilber (2000, 2006) has attempted to argue that his 
integral theory has moved away from perennialism and 
transcended metaphysics. These tactics can be rebutted 
as ineffectual because they rely on limited definitions of 
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these terms tailored to suit Wilber’s purposes rather than 
on conventional understandings (Ferrer, 2011a; Hartelius 
& Ferrer, 2013; Hartelius, 2015a). In a notable recent 
exchange John Abramson (2014), a proponent of Wilber’s 
integral theory, argued that Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) 
had misunderstood Wilber’s work. After a response by 
Hartelius (2015a), Abramson’s (2015) rejoinder was to 
abandon his original line of argument and argue instead 
that participatory was another version of perennialism, 
with Ferrer’s Mystery proposed as another instance of 
Wilber’s nondual ultimate. 
Many of the shortcomings of this characterization 
of Ferrer’s thought have already been identified in some 
detail (Hartelius, 2015b), but what deserves further 
articulation is the fact that a perennialist author such 
as Abramson employs a type of ontological claim about 
the nature of ultimate reality that is largely counter to 
the thrust of participatory thought. This distinction, 
though conceptually subtle, is central to the dichotomy 
between participatory and perennialist approaches. It is 
subtle because participatory thought allows for multiple 
culturally-situated ontological claims about ultimate 
reality (e.g., Ferrer, 2011a) just as a perennialist approach 
does (e.g., Wilber, 2006). The difference is not only in 
how this apparent tension is resolved, but also and more 
importantly, in the assumptions that inform a solution.
A perennialist approach considers multiple 
culturally-situated claims about the nature of reality to 
be imperfect reflections of an underlying nondual source. 
This nondual is something that exists in the same way that 
an object exists in conventional modernist thought: The 
object exists in itself, without reference to, dependence 
on, or relationship with any other, whether object or 
subject (cf. en soi, Sartre, 1943); a rock is a rock is a rock, 
whether it exists at the bottom of a stream or tumbling 
though interstellar space, or whether it sits on the altar 
of a meditator. The nondual of integral theory is held to 
exist in a manner where existence itself is objective in this 
way: this nondual exists in itself, as unchanging source 
(cf. Wilber, 2006), unaffected by the creation to which 
it gives rise, or the many traditions that bear it witness. 
In participatory thought, however, existence is 
not self-existent, but relational: The object is not primary, 
but something that arises, as it were, out of a network 
of relationships, a sort of intersubjective field. A rock is 
a rock because I have relationship with it—and it with 
me—and I simultaneously have relationships within 
a community where other, similar relationships exist, 
where the notion and language of “rock” have developed. 
In other words, an ontological claim within participatory 
thought is radically different than an ontological claim 
within a perennialist system because the very notion of 
what constitutes existence is different. 
An ontologial claim within participatory 
thought, then, is a claim about the existence of a particular 
relationship, or relational field, and the dynamic relational 
processes that arise within it. If I come to a rock with the 
needs and actions of a geologist, the process that exists 
as that relationship may be quite different than if I come 
as a subsistence tribesperson seeking a tool for grinding 
grain. Both relational processes actually exist, both are 
ontologically real, and each will impact its participants 
in differing ways—ways that in turn will shape the 
processes of the relational field. In this way the whole is 
more of a self-transforming or autopoietic (cf. Maturana 
& Varela, 1980) relational process than a collection of 
objects governed by rules. 
From this stance the nature of the existence is 
not objective: anything that exists is a transformative 
relational process constituted and cocreated by its 
participants, and as participants differ and relational 
patterns evolve, what actually exists will necessarily shift. 
In this way, culturally-situated ultimates actually exist 
and are ontologically real within particular relational 
fields; they will necessarily differ between communities 
that participate in different relational fields. In Ferrer’s 
(e.g., 2011) thought, then, multiple ontological claims 
regarding ultimacy can coexist because they are claims 
relating to ontologically real relational processes, not self-
existent objective-like referents. 
This critique of objective existence is closely 
related to the critique of universal knowledge claims that 
has been developed in feminist thought (e.g., Haraway, 
1988). A feminist approach argues that knowers are 
always located in and colored by a particular place, time, 
context, history, and body (Code, 1991; Harding, 1991), 
and that universal knowledge, which claims to be free 
from such influences, is logically impossible. This stance 
resembles the earlier metaphor of how it is impossible 
to describe a painting objectively from the standpoint of 
being part of the painting. 
To the degree that this argument is correct, 
efforts at describing the nature of ultimate reality are 
more about projecting one’s own location onto the whole 
than about perceiving what is true. Wilber’s speculations 
about a nondual source are no better and no worse 
than any other mythology that arises from a particular 
cultural location—in this case from the location of a 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies vi
White American male interested in finding authoritative 
knowledge about ultimate reality as reflected in all 
spiritual traditions. While his system seeks to encompass 
a great many traditions, it addresses them from the very 
particular viewpoint of a historically and culturally 
located, gender-bodied person (cf. Code, 1991; Harding, 
1991). Neither an inner feeling of certainty nor any 
number of other (predominantly male) thinkers offering 
similar speculations—his so-called perennial sages 
(Wilber, 2000)—make the case any stronger. 
However, given that integral theory has 
already appropriated most spiritual traditions of any 
size, it is no surprise that it should attempt to do the 
same with a competing theory that points to the highly 
problematic shortcomings of its perennialist approach. 
Cultural appropriation is the exploitation of other 
cultures by a more dominant culture (e.g., Ziff & Rao, 
1997), as when European-American culture takes on 
Native American elements of dress or practice, outside 
of the context of an informed and mutually respectful 
relationship with the communities to whom these 
cultural elements belong. Perennialism, which considers 
itself superior to every tradition and self-authorized to 
inform each tradition about its actual essence, is a strong 
example of cultural appropriation (e.g., King, 2001). To 
claim that participatory thought is really just another 
version of perennialism is an extension of this naturally 
appropriative stance.
The basis for this argument by integral theorists, 
then, reveals its shortcoming: Abramson (2015) claimed 
that participatory thought is perennialist in nature 
based on the assumption that Ferrer’s notion of an 
unknown Mystery underlying human spirituality could 
be interpreted as making a similar claim as perennialism 
about the objective nature of ultimate reality. Ferrer’s 
thought (2002), on the other hand, is situated in an 
entirely different ontology, a transformed notion of what 
constitutes existence. Ferrer has consistently distanced 
himself from perennialism based on this difference, 
having noted that objectivist assumptions about reality 
have deleterious impact on human values and relationship 
and the cultivation of transformative potential. In 
participatory approaches it is how an ultimate vision 
reflects and shapes these latter that has primacy, not how 
it might inform speculations about an ultimate objective 
reality that, within participatory thought, has no actual 
existence.
The challenge that integral perennialism set 
out to resolve is nevertheless a worthy one: to construct 
a philosophical context in which both science and 
scholarship can engage with those aspects of being human 
that are both subtler and more powerful than the mundane 
rhythms of daily life. By offering a frame in which objects 
are the product of relationships, rather than vice-versa, 
mystical, spiritual, and exceptional human experiences 
can be considered as actually-existing relational events (cf. 
Ferrer, 2008) rather than non-existing objects. By offering 
a critical frame that nonetheless grants ontological reality 
to these events, it becomes reasonable to seek ways that 
these phenomena might be examined with a scientific 
method that is rigorous in traditional ways yet subtly 
transformed by application within a novel philosophical 
context (cf. Hartelius, 2007). Here, then, may be the seeds 
of a psychology that can pursue inquiry into presence, 
attention, intuition, creativity, experiences of elevation, 
transcendence and awakening, and the subtle dynamics 
of mind and relationship, in a way that does not diminish 
those phenomena through the application of ill-fitting 
tools of analysis. The result may be not only a deeper 
understanding of these exceptional human experiences 
and capacities, but a revision of the psychological notion 
of what it is to be human (Hartelius, Caplan, & Rardin, 
2007). 
In This Issue
In 1985 Linda Meyers published a paper in the Journal of Black Psychology entitled, Transpersonal 
Psychology: The Role of the Afrocentric Paradigm. 
This paper pointed out the fact that the sort of integral 
worldview favored by transpersonal psychology existed 
in the African world view and in psychological theory 
deriving from that world view. On discovering this 
paper in the literature, I went directly to the Journal of 
Transpersonal Psychology  to see what response this might 
have drawn. Here was an invitation to expand beyond 
the approaches of East and West, and include another 
great swath of human culture. There was, however, no 
sign of a response from the transpersonal community in 
its main journals. It is my hope that the Special Topic 
Section, edited by Angelina Graham, may serve as a 
belated response that acknowledges the importance—
indeed the indispensability—of the contribution and 
participation of Black psychology in any comprehensive 
approach to transpersonal psychology. 
 In addition to this special section, introduced 
elsewhere by its editor, this issue offers a number of 
engaging papers in its general section, as well as book 
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reviews and responses to the editor that are worthy of 
attention. 
 First of these is a paper that presents validation 
for a Chinese version of a spiritual intelligence scale. This 
paper, by Arita Chan and Angela Siu, is descriptively 
titled, “Application of the Spiritual Intelligence Self-
Report Inventory (SISRI-24) Among Hong Kong 
University Students,” and represents a piece of the 
important work of bringing transpersonally relevant 
concepts into diverse cultural contexts. It also reflects 
the importance of scale development and other empirical 
research for whole person approaches to psychology.
 Kathleen Pantano and Jeremy Genovese offer 
a novel study that inverts prior research: instead of 
considering the impact of internally- or externally-
focused attention on a task such as balance training, 
their research tests the imact of different forms of 
attentional focus on the development of mindfulness. 
This paper, entitled, “The Effect of Internally versus 
Externally Focused Balance Training on Mindfulness,” 
breaks important new ground on the relationship 
between attentional focus and mindfulness in a manner 
that promises to lead to future research.
 Following this is a truly engaging paper on the 
Norse war magic phenomenon of beserkergang, a type 
of invulnerability magic that has often been considered 
either mythic or the result of intoxication. Author 
Jenny Wade makes a careful, detailed, and far-ranging 
scholarly case for this phenomenon as a transpersonal 
state of consciousness that confers remarkable abilities 
far beyond conventional human capacities. This paper, 
titled, “Going Berserk:  Battle Trance and Ecstatic Holy 
Warriors in the European War Magic Tradition,” includes 
both ancient and contemporary sources, and offers 
evidence for the limitations of such states.
 Gabriel Crane’s paper, “Harnessing the 
Placebo Effect: A New Model for Mind-Body Healing 
Mechanisms,” is a refreshingly thorough and balanced 
consideration of the difficult and often contentious topic 
of the placebo effect. Weaving together developments 
from transpersonal theory with empirical research, Crane 
critiques contemporary models of the phenomenon and 
offers a satisfying reframe on this elusive yet powerful 
process. Crane’s paper also garnered a positive and 
elucidating response from James Giordano, which is 
included after the Special Topic Section.
 In a related paper, Alix Sleight provides a 
theoretical frame to help understand the power and 
limitations of meaning-making in cancer patients. This 
paper, “Liminality and Ritual in Biographical work: 
A Theoretical Framework for Cancer Survivorship,” 
considers the potentially disruptive impact of cancer 
on the personal narrative, and how ritual processes can 
help to resolve this in ways that promote wellbeing and 
quality of life in ways that truly enhance the lives of 
cancer patients and cancer survivors. 
 Finally, a Letter to the Editor from Judith 
Blackstone opens long-overdue dialogue about the 
meaning of nonduality, and whether there are grounds 
for claiming that certain shifted states of mind that 
soften conventional boundaries between body and world 
are actually unconstructed states of consciousness that 
reveal the essential nature of consciousness.
 
  Glenn Hartelius, Main EditorCalifornia Institute of Integral Studies
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